查看完整版本 : [測試] 新手上路

05-09-20, 09:46 PM
新手上路! :00:

05-09-22, 09:10 PM
○●◎還是測試: :00::02::03:。

05-09-22, 09:10 PM
○●◎還是測試: :00::02::03:。

05-10-03, 07:47 PM
A criminal defense attorney has an obligation to turn the prosecution physical evidence which comes into his possession.
The privileged character of the communication between attorney and client confines to the legitimate course of professional employment.
Effective assistance of counsel
Professional responsibility
Referral fee
Retainer agreement
The First Amendment

05-10-05, 05:47 PM
Accessory: Aiding or contributing in a secondary way to a crime or assisting in or contributing to a crime.

Accomplice: One who knowingly and voluntarily help commit a crime.

Acquittal: When a person who has been charged with committing a crime is found not guilty by the courts.

Admissible: A term used to describe information that is allowed to be used as evidence or information in a court case.

Age of consent: The age at which a person may marry without parental approval.

Age of majority

Aggravated assault: A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he or she tries to cause serious bodily injury to another or causes such injury purposely, knowingly, or recklessly without any concern for that person or without remorse.

This is a proceeding to receive a recommendation of the State Bar of California that Ted Bushman be suspended from the practice of law for one year. Bushman was found by the State Bar Disciplinary Board to have charged and attempted to collect an exorbitant and unconscionable fee from clients.

On November 7, 1969, Bushman was retained by Barbara Cox, aged 16, her mother and father (Mr. and Mrs. Stroud) (hereinafter referred to as the defendants) in connection with an action filed by Barbara’s husband, Neal W. Cox, for divorce and custody of a minor child of the marriage. The only substantial issue in Cox’s was custody. Barbara’s parents were named as defendants because it was alleged that they might have had physical custody of the child.

Cox was represented by attorney Gertrude Chern. At Bushman’s request, the defendants signed a promissory for $5,000, payable forthwith and the balance at $50 a month. They also signed a retainer agreement providing for an hourly fee of not less than $60. Barbara was a minor, her parents were on welfare, and there was no community property of the Cox marriage. Bushman advised the defendants it was the policy of his office that, whenever attorney Chern was the opposing counsel in a custody matter, a minimum retainer of $5,000 was required without regard to the time spent by Bushman on the case or to other factors, because Mrs. Chern would generate a “paper war.” Subsequently, when Cox visited Bushman’s office in connection with a possible reconciliation with Barbara, Bushman unsuccessfully to induce him to add his signature to the promissory note.

耶~! 簽名出現了 :em02: ↓

05-10-14, 03:05 PM
版大,借我貼一下~~~我8:00pm 會清掉→很重要
[19]The efficacy of the State’s effort to preventive clients would be substantially diminished if, having proved a solicitation in circumstances like those of this case, the State were required in addition to prove actual injury. Unlike the advertising in Bates, in-person solicitation is not visible or otherwise open to public scrutiny. Often there is no witness other than the lawyer and the lay person whom he has solicited, rendering it difficult or impossible to obtain reliable proof of what actually took place. This would be especially true if the lay person were so distressed at the time of the solicitation that he could not recall specific details at a later date. If appellant’s view were sustained, in-person solicitation would be virtually immune to effective oversight and regulation by the State or by the legal profession, in contravention of the State’s strong interest in regulating members of the Bar in an effective, objective, and self-enforcing manner. It therefore is not unreasonable, or violative of the Constitution, for a State to respond with in effort is a prophylactic rule.

[20]On the basis of the undisputed facts of records, we conclude that the Discipline Rules constitutionally could be applied to appellant. He approached two young accident victims at a time when they were especially incapable of making informed judgments or of assessing and prohibiting their won interests. He solicited Carol McClintock in s hospital room where she lay in traction and sought out Wanda Lou Holbert on the day she came from the hospital, knowing from his prior inquiries that she had just been released. Appellant urged his services upon the young women and used the information he had obtained from the McClintock, and the fact of his agreement with Carol, to induce Wanda to say “O.K.” in response to his solicitation. He employed a concealed tape recover, seemingly to insure that he would have evidence of Wanda’s oral assent to the representation. He emphasized that his fee would come out of a recovery, thereby tempting the young women with what sounded like accost-free and therefore irresistible offer. He refused to withdraw when Mrs. Holbert requested him to do so only a day after the initial meeting between appellant and Wanda Lou and continued to represent himself to the insurance company as Wanda holbert’s lawyer.

[21]The court below did not hold that these or other facts were proof of actual harm to Wanda Holbert or McClintock but rested on the conclusion that appellant had engaged in the general misconduct proscribed by the Disciplinary Rules. Under our view of the State’s interest in averting harm by prohibiting solicitation in circumstances where it is likely to occur, the absence of explicit proof or findings of harm or injury is immaterial. The facts in this case present a striking example of the potential for overcharging that is inherent in a lawyer’s in-person solicitation of professional employment. They also demonstrate the need for prophylactic regulation in furtherance of the State’s interest in protecting the lay public. We hold that the appellant of DR 2-103 (A) and 2-104 (A) to appellant does not offend the Constitution.

[22]Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is affirmed.

05-10-14, 03:07 PM
版大,借我貼一下~~~我8:00pm 會清掉→很重要
[10]It also is argued that in-person solicitation may provide the solicited the individual with information about his or her legal rights and remedies. In this case, appellant gave Wanda Lou a “tip” about the prospect of recovery based on the uninformed-motorist clause in the McClintock s’ insurance policy, and he explained that clause and Ohio’s guest statute to Carol McClintock’s parents. But neither of the Discipline Rules here at Issue prohibited appellant from communication information to these young women about their legal rights and the prospects of obtaining a monetary, or from recommending that they obtain counsel. DR 2-104 (A) Merely prohibited him from using the information as bait with which to obtain an argument to represent them for a fee. The Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from giving unsolicited legal advice; it proscribes the acceptance of employment resulting from such advice.

[11]A lawyer’s procurement of remunerative employment is a subject only marginally affected with First Amendment concerns. It falls with the State’s proper sphere of economic and professional regulation. While entitled to some constitutional protection, appellant’s conduct is subject to furtherance of important state interests.

[12]The state interests implied in this case are particularly strong. In addition to its general interest in protecting consumers and regulating commercial transactions, the State bears a special responsibility for maintaining standards among members of the licensed professions. “The interest of the State in regulating lawyer is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary government function of administering justice, and have historical been ‘officers of the courts.’ ” While lawyers act in part as “self-employed businessmen,” they also act “as trusted agents of their clients, and as assistants to the court in search of a just solution to disputes.”

[13]The substantive evils of solicitation have been stated over the years in sweeping terms: stirring up litigation, assertion of fraudulent claims, debasing the legal profession, and potential harm to the solicited client in the form of overcharging, overcharging, underrepresentation, and mispresentation. The American Bar Association defends the rule against solicitation primarily on three board grounds: It is said that the prohibitions embodied in DR 2-103 (A) and 2-104 (A) serve to reduce the likelihood of overreaching and the exertion of undue influence on lay persons, to protect the privacy of individuals, and to avoid situations where the lawyer’s exercise of judgment on behalf of the client will be clouded by his own pecuniary self-interest.

[14]We need not discuss or evaluate each of there interests in detail as appellant has conceded that the State has a legitimate and indeed “compelling” interest in preventing those aspects of solicitation that involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overcharging, and other forms of “vexatious conduct.” We agree that protection of the public from these aspects of solicitation is a legitimate and important state interest.

[15]Appellant’s concession that strong state interests justify regulation to the evils he enumerates would end this case but for his insistence that none of those evils was found to be present in his acts of solicitation. He challenges what he characterizes as the “indiscriminate application” of the Rules to him and thus attacks the validity of DR 2-103 (A) and DR 2-104 (A) not facially, but as applied to his acts of solicitation. And because no allegations or findings were made of the specific wrongs appellant concedes would justify disciplinary action, appellant terms his solicitation “pure,” meaning “soliciting and obtaining agreements from Carol McClintock and Wanda Lou Holbert to represent each of them,” without more. Appellant therefore argues that we must decide whether a State may discipline him for solicitation perse without offending the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

[16]We agree that the appropriate focus is on appellants conduct. And, as appellant urges, we must undertake an independent review of the record to determine whether that conduct was constitutionally protected. But appellant errs in assuming that the constitutional validity of the judgment below depends on proof that his conduct constituted actual overreaching or inflicted some specific injury on Wanda or Carol McClintock. His assumption flows from the premise that nothing less than actual provided harm to the solicited individual would be a sufficiently important state interest to justify disciplining the attorney who solicits employment in person for pecuniary gain.

[17]Appellant’s argument misconceives the native of the State’s interest. The Rules prohibiting solicitation are prophylactic measures whose objective is the prevention of harm before it occurs. The Rules were applied on this case to discipline a lawyer for soliciting employment for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to result in the adverse consequences the State seeks to avert. In such a situation, which is inherently conductive to overreaching and other forms of misconduct, the State has a strong interest in adopting and enforcing rules of conduct designed to protect the public from harmful solicitation by lawyers whom it has licensed.

[18]The State’s perception of the potential for harm circumstances such as those presented in this case is well founded. The detrimental aspects of face-to face selling even of ordinary consumer products have been recognized and addressed by the Federal Trade Commission, and it hardly need be said that the potential for overcharging is significantly greater when a lawyer, a professional trained art of persuasion, personally solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay person. Such an individual may place his trust in a lawyer, regardless of the latter’s qualifications or the individual’s actual need for legal representation, simply in response to persuasion under circumstances conductive to uninformed acquiescence. Although it is argued that personal solicitation is valuable because it may apprise a victim of misfortune of his legal rights, the very plight of that person not only makes him more vulnerable to influence but also may advice all the more intrusive. Thus, under these adverse conditions the overtures of an uninvited lawyer may distress the solicited individual simply because of their obtrusiveness and the invasion of the individual’s privacy, even when no other harm materializes. Under such circumstances, it is not unreasonable for the state to presume that in-person solicitation by lawyers more often than not will be injurious to the person solicited.

06-11-26, 06:41 PM